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CEO Sensation Seeking and Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether CEOs’ sensation seeking is related to their firms’ 
financial reporting quality. Consistent with a tendency of sensation seekers to defy 
ethical rules, we find that firms with sensation-seeking CEOs have lower financial 
reporting quality and higher likelihood of accounting fraud. More specifically, we find that 
firms led by sensation-seeking CEOs engage in more accrual-based and real earnings 
management, have higher information opacity and are more likely to have internal 
control deficiencies and use less conservative accounting. Firms with sensation-seeking 
CEOs are also more likely to engage in accounting fraud as indicated by the SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). We further find that good 
corporate governance does not mitigate the adverse effects of sensation-seeking CEOs 
on financial reporting quality. Finally, we find a positive association between sensation-
seeking CEOs and audit fees. Our results are robust to CEO change, instrument variable 
method and propensity score matching. In summary, our results suggest that the CEO 
personality trait of sensation seeking plays an important role in financial reporting 
quality. 
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CEO Sensation Seeking and Financial Reporting Quality 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent empirical studies in accounting and finance show that managerial 
personality traits can and do significantly influence important corporate decisions such 
as acquisitions, leverage, voluntary disclosure, earnings management and tax avoidance 
(e.g., Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Bamber, Jiang, 
and Wang 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer 
2011; Benmelech and Frydman 2015). Relatively unknown is whether the personality 
trait of sensation seeking, defined by the search for novel experiences and the readiness 
to take risks for such experiences (Zuckerman, 1979), is related to financial reporting 
quality. We specifically examine whether CEOs’ sensation seeking is associated with 
lower quality of financial reporting, as well as higher likelihood of accounting fraud.  
We hypothesize that sensation-seeking CEOs are more likely to defy accounting 
regulations and opportunistically disclose accounting information than non-sensation-
seeking CEOs, and thus the financial reporting quality of firms with sensation-seeking 
CEOs tends to be lower. This hypothesis draws on important findings in psychology 
literature. The psychology literature defines the trait of sensation seeking as “the need 
for varied, novel, and complex sensations and experiences and the willingness to take 
physical and social risks for the sake of such experience” (Zuckerman, 1979). Sensation 
seeking has four sub-traits: Thrill and adventure seeking; Experience seeking; 
Disinhibition; Boredom susceptibility (Zuckerman, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1978). Of 
particular relevance to this study is the sub-trait of disinhibition, defined as strong 
preference for intense out of control activities or unethical activities such as drug 
consumption, risky driving and illegal activities (Zuckerman, Eysenck and Eysenck, 
 3 
 
1978). Psychology literature suggests disinhibited individuals are more likely to 
commit unethical behaviors and frauds (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009).  
Following the psychology literature and finance literature (Zuckerman 1979; 
Cain and McKeon 2016; Sunder et al. 2017), we use the possession of a pilot license as 
an empirical proxy for the trait of sensation seeking. We analyze the impact of CEOs’ 
sensation seeking on financial reporting quality by comparing the financial reporting 
quality of pilot CEO firms with that of non-pilot CEO firms. We propose that those who 
seek sensational experiences in their personal life, such as piloting an airplane, are more 
likely to pursue risks in financial reporting decisions.1 Our sample consists of 11,194 
firm-year observations of pilot and non-pilot CEOs between 1992 and 2010. We first 
examine the implication of CEO sensation seeking for financial reporting quality. 
Consistent with the empirical evidence in psychology literature of the association 
between sensation seeking and unethical behaviors, our empirical evidence suggests 
that firms led by pilot CEOs engage in more accrual-based and real earnings 
management, have higher information opacity and higher likelihood of internal control 
deficiencies, and use less conservative accounting. Additionally, we find that stronger 
corporate governance does not mitigate the adverse effects of pilot CEOs on financial 
reporting quality.  
Next, we explore the relationships between CEO sensation seeking and earnings 
management outside of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), i.e. 
accounting fraud, since psychology research suggests that high sensation seekers are 
more likely to commit acts of deception (Lu 2008; DeAndrea et al. 2009; Dickey 2014). 
We find that sensation-seeking CEOs are related to higher incidence of engaging in 
                                           
1 There is an emerging stream of literature in accounting and finance that applies behavioral consistency 
theory and links personality traits to corporate decision making (e.g. Cronqvist et al. 2012; Chyz 2013; 
Davidson et al. 2015; Bushman et al. 2017). We discuss those studies in literature review. 
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accounting fraud as indicated by the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release 
(AAER). 
Finally, we examine whether there is any third-party consequences related to 
CEO sensation seeking. We assess the response of auditors to CEO sensation seeking. 
We focus on the sensitivity of auditors to sensation-seeking CEOs because auditors are 
a unique group of stakeholders who have insider-like access to accounting records and 
are very sensitive to financial reporting quality due to litigation concerns (DeFond and 
Zhang, 2014). We find that auditors charge firms led by pilot CEOs higher audit fees, 
suggesting that auditors do take CEO sensation seeking into account when setting their 
prices.  
As sensation-seeking CEOs are not randomly assigned to firms in our sample, 
we are unable to exclude the possibility of unobserved firm characteristics 
contaminating our results and make a definite causal inference. For example, sensation-
seeking CEOs with observable management styles may be attracted to certain firms. In 
the robustness checks, we employ an instrument variable and the propensity score 
matching method to address this issue. Our results remain robust. 
We make the following important contributions to the literature: (1) To our best 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the relationship between sensation seeking 
and financial reporting quality. Our study identifies a new individual-level determinant 
of financial reporting quality: CEOs’ sensation seeking. (2) We add to the emerging 
literature on the relationship between CEO characteristics and financial reporting 
quality by documenting a negative relationship between CEOs’ sensation seeking and 
financial reporting quality. Huang et al. (2012) investigate CEO age and financial 
reporting, while Schrand and Zechman (2012) examine managerial overconfidence and 
fraud. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find a relationship between CEO overconfidence 
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and accounting conservatism. (3) We also contribute to the literature on CEO sensation 
seeking. Cain and McKeon (2016) suggest that CEO sensation seeking is positively 
associated with aggressive investment policy2. Sunder et al. (2017) demonstrate that 
sensation-seeking CEOs are more innovative. Our evidence indicates that CEO 
sensation seeking exacerbates the agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
since pilot CEOs engage in more earnings management, and their firms have a lower 
accounting quality. Taken together, these studies provide empirical evidence on how 
CEO sensation seeking affects corporate behavior in an agency problem setting. 
Our study is subject to some limitations. First, as with other psychological traits, 
sensation seeking is not directly observable. Although piloting is a well-validated 
empirical proxy of sensation seeking adopted in prior research (Cain and McKeon 2016; 
Sunder et al. 2017), we acknowledge sensation seeking is a multi-faceted construct and 
the interpretation of our results may be influenced by the validity of this empirical proxy. 
Nonetheless, our evidence shows the personal trait of sensation seeking is an important 
consideration in financial reporting quality. Second, our results, as other empirical 
accounting research, are subject to bias of endogeneity. Although we cannot 
unambiguously rule out endogenous explanations, our results are robust to a battery of 
rigorous econometrics tests, including difference-in-differences, instrument variable, 
and propensity score matching analyses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss prior literature 
and develop our hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 describes the sample selection 
process and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the results of our main 
analyses, and Section 5 presents the results of additional analyses. Section 6 provides 
                                           
2 While Cain and McKeon (2016) explore the risk-taking behaviors of pilot CEOs, they acknowledge 
that it is the construct of sensation seeking that bestows pilot CEOs with higher appetite for risk.” 
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the results of robustness checks, and finally Section 7 concludes the study. 
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. The Trait of Sensation Seeking 
Personality traits have been conceptualized from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives and the field of personality psychology has put forth a general taxonomy 
of personality traits known as the five-factor model of personality: openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Tupes 
and Christal 1961). Openness to experience is a general appreciation for adventure, 
unusual ideas, and novel experience. The definition of the trait of sensation seeking is 
developed on the basis of openness in the five-factor model and is subsequently defined 
in the psychology literature as “the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and 
experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks for the sake of such 
experience” (Zuckerman 1979, page 10). Traditional psychological research has 
demonstrated that the level of sensation seeking is influenced by genetic, biological, 
psychophysiological and social factors and affects certain behaviors and attitudes such 
as occupational choice, recreation, lifestyle, social interactions and financial decisions 
(Zuckerman 1979).  
Sensation seeking has four sub-traits: Thrill and adventure seeking; Experience 
seeking; Disinhibition; Boredom susceptibility satisfaction (Zuckerman, Eysenck and 
Eysenck, 1978). The link between sensation seeking and financial reporting quality 
hinges on the sub-trait of disinhibition, which is defined as strong preference for intense 
out of control activities or unethical activities such as drug consumption, risky driving 
and illegal activities (Zuckerman, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1978). Disinhibition is an 
externalized trait which is indicative of irresponsibility, impulsivity, aggressiveness, 
and disrespect of ethics (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009). A disinhibited individual 
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lacks proper ethical prudence and the ability to anticipate the consequences of his/her 
actions. The disinhibited individual also demonstrates impaired emotional regulation 
and impulsive behaviors. Disinhibition is considered as the least socially acceptable 
sub-trait of sensation seeking due to its potentially destructive effect on ethics and social 
order (Zuckerman, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1978). 
Extensive psychological studies have provided strong empirical evidence that 
sensation seekers with high level of disinhibition are more likely to ignore constraints 
and disrespect ethics (Zuckerman, 1979). The wide variety of unethical behaviors 
identified in the psychological studies include cheating in both personal life and in 
career (Lu 2008), drug and alcohol abuse (DeAndrea et al. 2009; Dickey 2014), white-
collar crime and conventional crime (Craig and Piquero 2017), street violence (Nussio, 
2017), traffic violations (Oppenheim, Oron-Gilad, Parmet and Shinar, 2016) and 
delinquencies (Ljubin-Golub, Vrselja, and Pandžić, 2016). 
2.2. Attributes of Financial Reporting Quality 
A large body of literature examines the determinants of financial reporting 
quality. As summarized by Dechow et al. (2010), firm size, debt and firm performance 
are found to influence financial reporting quality. Earlier literature suggests that 
financial reporting quality decreases as firm size increases since larger firms are more 
likely to engage in income-decreasing manipulation to avoid regulatory scrutiny (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986). However, recent papers find that firm size is positively 
correlated with financial reporting quality (Carcello and Nagy 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2007). Firms with higher leverage are more likely to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Beatty 
and Weber 2003). Traditional auditing literature (Becker et al. 1998; Behn et al. 2008) 
believes auditor size (such as Big N) is positively correlated with financial reporting 
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quality. However, using propensity score matching, recent literature has shown that the 
relation between Big N and financial reporting quality is insignificant (Lawrence et al. 
2011). 
An emerging literature has investigated the effects of CEO characteristics on 
firms’ financial reporting quality. Huang et al. (2012) investigate the relationship 
between CEO age and the accounting quality of firms. They find that firms with older 
CEOs have higher accounting quality, measured by whether the firms are able to meet 
or beat analyst forecasts. Schrand and Zechman (2012) examine managerial 
overconfidence and fraud, and they document overconfident executives are more likely 
to commit accounting frauds.  Ahmed and Duellman (2013) predict and find that 
overconfident CEOs tend to delay loss recognition and exhibit lower accounting 
conservatism. The reason is that such CEOs usually overestimate future investment 
returns. 
In summary, prior literature has investigated the effects of various firm or CEO 
characteristics on financial reporting quality. However, the impact of CEO sensation 
seeking on financial reporting quality has not been studied. We seek to fill this void by 
providing empirical evidence. 
2.4. Hypothesis Development  
Motivated by behavioral consistency theory which suggests that individuals 
behave in a consistent manner across similar situations, we predict that CEOs with a 
higher level of sensation seeking are more likely to misreport accounting numbers.  
Behavioral consistency theory is well established in psychology and suggests 
that personality traits are relatively stable and are not determined or influenced by 
situational variables or contextual changes (Allport 1937; 1966). Epstein (1979) finds 
that stability coefficients increase as the measures of behavior are averaged over an 
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increasing number of events. He concludes that it is possible to predict behavior based 
on the average of a sample of situations and/or occasions. Behavioral consistency 
theory argues that how one behaves in one situation is predictable from how one 
behaves in similar situations. Using the findings from two experiments, Stone et al. 
(2002) conclude that many of the findings from risk research on individual decision 
making concerning financial situations can be generalized to decision making for others.  
There is an emerging literature in finance and accounting that applies behavioral 
consistency theory and links personality traits to corporate decision making. These 
studies examine how a CEO’s behavior at work and his or her behavior outside of work 
are related. Cronqvist et al. (2012) suggest that a CEO who assumes a large amount of 
leverage in his or her personal finances will do the same in corporate finance. Chyz 
(2013) shows that managers who avoid personal tax aggressively are more likely to use 
tax shelters at the firm level. Benmelech and Frydman (2015) demonstrate that military 
CEOs with a higher sense of ethics are less likely to engage in corporate fraud. 
Davidson et al. (2015) find that managers’ behaviors and preferences outside of work, 
such as luxury goods ownership and law infringement, are related to financial reporting 
quality. Specifically, they show that managers who like to own luxury goods are more 
likely to misreport earnings and managers with prior legal infractions are associated 
with a corrupt financial reporting environment. Bushman et al. (2017) demonstrate that 
materialistic CEOs, or CEOs owning luxury goods, are associated with lax firm risk 
management. 
Following behavioral consistency theory (Epstein 1979; Stone et al. 2002), we 
argue that risk-takers who seek sensational experiences in their personal life, such as 
piloting an airplane, are more likely to pursue risks in financial reporting decisions. 
Agency theory suggests that managers have incentives to misreport accounting 
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numbers to extract private benefits (Cheng and Warfield 2005). However, accounting 
misreporting comes with considerable risks which managers must bear if it is exposed. 
The risks include compensation penalties (Dechow et al. 1996), reputational loss (Desai 
et al. 2006), and job termination (Efendi et al. 2013). Risk-takers believe that the 
benefits of the sensational experiences are worth pursuing and pay less attention to the 
risk of being caught (Zuckerman 1979). As financial reporting manipulation is akin to 
taking a gamble in that one could get caught, sensation-seeking CEOs are more likely 
to focus on the benefits of accounting misreporting and emphasize the probability of 
not being caught, and they are more willing to take the risk of being found out. We thus 
propose the following hypothesis: 
            Hypothesis: Firms led by sensation-seeking pilot CEOs have lower financial 
reporting quality.  
3. Main Variables, Data Sources, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources   
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection procedure. We begin with all 
31,885 firm-year observations having CEO data available in the ExecuComp database 
from the year 1992 to 2010.3 We exclude 4,361 observations in the financial services 
and utility industries. We drop 9,714 observations without sufficient data to calculate 
CEO characteristics measures such as pilot CEO, CEO age, and CEO tenure. Lastly, 
we exclude 5,616 observations that do not have sufficient data to calculate financial 
reporting quality and control variables. Our final sample consists of 11,194 firm-year 
observations. We extract financial data from Compustat, stock return data from CRSP 
and CEO characteristics data from ExecuComp.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the sample distribution by year. The sample size 
                                           
3 We conclude at 2010 since it is the last year for which we have pilot CEO information. 
 11 
 
varies over time, ranging from a low of 34 observations in 1992 to a high of 831 
observations in 2003. We start our sample from the year 1992 because CEO-related 
variables are available from 1992 onward.4  
3.2 Main Variables 
3.2.1 CEO Sensation Seeking  
Following Cain and McKeon (2016) and Sunder et al. (2017), we measure 
CEO’s sensation seeking using whether a CEO has a private pilot license. Cain and 
McKeon (2016) collect CEO names from ExecuComp and pilot names from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA)’s Airmen Certification Database.5  If a name is not 
found in the FAA database, they assume that this CEO is not a pilot. If a name is found 
in the FAA database, to verify the match they collect additional information such as 
age, home and firm address, and other personal information from the following 
databases: LexisNexis, Bloomberg, and other public resources. In this paper, we define 
Pilot CEO as an indicator variable that is equal to one if a CEO holds a pilot license 
and zero otherwise.6 Our final sample consists of 108 pilot CEOs and 2,304 non-pilot 
CEOs between 1992 and 2010. 
 According to data provided by the life insurance industry, piloting small aircraft 
is a dangerous activity and associated with increased levels of health risk.7 For a 40-
year-old male who qualifies for standard (average life expectancy) policies, McFall 
(1992) finds that there is a 100% increase in the mortality rate from piloting small 
airplanes.8 For individuals only qualifying for substandard (high risk) policies, there is 
a 200% increase in mortality rate associated with piloting small aircraft. Cain and 
                                           
4 Our results are still robust after excluding the 34 observations of 1992. 
5 http://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/airmen_certification/releasable_airmen_download/  
6 We thank Matthew D. Cain and Stephen B. McKeon for providing the data. 
7 Most pilot CEOs only have licenses to operate small airplanes. Cain and McKeon (2016) also provide 
evidence that CEOs in the sample operate airplanes for hobby, not for business use. 
8 These are civilian aviators flying for hobby, the category to which most pilot CEOs belong. 
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McKeon (2016) show that the fatality rate for personal/business flying is 21.5 fatalities 
per million hours, which makes it 30 times more dangerous than driving and the most 
dangerous activity among the nine forms of activities they analyze.9 The evidence from 
McFall (1992) and Cain and McKeon (2016) clearly shows that piloting small airplanes 
is associated with elevated sensation seeking. 
3.2.2 Financial Reporting Quality 
Following Chi et al. (2011) and McGuire et al. (2012), we employ several 
measures to capture financial reporting quality: accrual-based earnings management, 
information opacity, and AAER accounting fraud.  
First, we estimate the absolute abnormal accruals from the modified Jones 
model (AM1) (Jones 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dechow et al. 1995) and the 
ROA-adjusted modified Jones model (AM2) (Kothari et al. 2005) to proxy for accrual-
based earnings management.  
Second, Hutton et al. (2009) investigate the relation between the transparency 
of financial statements and the distribution of stock returns. They find that firms with 
higher information opacity have higher synchronicity, indicating less firm-specific 
information available for these firms. Following Hutton et al. (2009), we use the 
moving sum of three years’ absolute value of discretionary accruals from the modified 
Jones model (AM1) and that from the ROA-adjusted modified Jones model (AM2) to 
capture information opacity (Information Opacity 1 and Information Opacity 2). 
Lastly, following Davidson et al. (2015), we use the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) fraud as a 
measure of financial reporting quality. As DeFond and Zhang (2014) suggest, AAER 
                                           
9 The nine forms of activities Cain and McKeon (2016) analyze are: (i) personal/business flying, (ii) 
motorcycles, (iii) hot air balloons, (iv) personal helicopters, (v) ‘crop dusters,’ (vi) commercial 
helicopters, (vii) corporate/executive flying, (viii) passenger cars, and (ix) commercial airlines. 
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accounting fraud has fewer measurement errors than other accounting quality measures. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. On average, 
5.1% of CEOs are classified as pilot CEOs, which is consistent with Cain and McKeon 
(2016). The means (medians) of AM1, AM2, Information Opacity 1, Information 
Opacity 2, RM1 and RM2 are 0.064 (0.061), 0.076 (0.072), 0.236 (0.173), 0.204 (0.147), 
0.033 (0.377) and 0.003 (0.248), respectively. Generally, these statistics are consistent 
with the prior literature (Kothari et al. 2005; Hutton et al. 2009; Gunny 2010; McGuire 
et al. 2011; Zang et al. 2011).  
About 1.7% of the firms engage in AAER accounting fraud. On average, 8.9% 
of sample firms report significant deficiencies or material weaknesses in their internal 
controls. Only 0.2% of firms report fraud-related internal control weaknesses. 
Regarding CEO characteristics, 72.5% firms have CEOs over 60 years of age. Around 
2.6% of firms have female CEOs. The average CEO tenure is four years. As for firm 
characteristics, the average firm assets is 1356.95 million dollars and has a leverage of 
51.9%. About 69.2% of the firms are audited by Big N auditors, and the average auditor 
tenure is nine years.       
Panel B of Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations between pilot CEOs and 
financial reporting quality measures. We find that pilot CEOs are positively correlated 
with AM1, Information Opacity 1, Information Opacity 2, AAER, and Fraud_ICW_404, 
which provides preliminary support for the hypothesis that firms with pilot CEOs are 
associated with lower quality of financial reporting. To more convincingly establish the 
relationship between sensation-seeking pilot CEOs and financial reporting quality, next 
we consider confounding factors such as CEO age and gender which may affect the 
quality of financial reporting in multivariate regressions. 
 14 
 
4. Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1. Methodology 
 We estimate the relation between CEO sensation seeking and financial reporting 
quality using the following regression model:  
Financial Reporting Quality = β0 + β1Pilot CEO + β2Age50-59 + β3Age>=60 + 
β4Female CEO + β5Ln(Tenure) + β6Overconfidence + β7Delta + β8Vega + β9SIZE + 
β10Firm Age + β11Inventory Ratio + β12LEV + β13NOA + β14Big N + β15 Auditor Tenure 
+ β16Sales Growth + β17Operating Volatility + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed 
Effects + ε                                                                                                                (1)
          
where Financial Reporting Quality refers to one of the following: accrual-based 
earnings management, information opacity, and AAER accounting fraud.  
 Following prior studies such as Cain and McKeon (2016), we control for CEO 
age (Age50-59; Age>=60),10 CEO gender (Female CEO), CEO tenure (Ln(Tenure)), 
CEO overconfidence (Overconfidence) and CEO risk-taking (Delta and Vega). 
Drawing on prior studies (Lobo and Zhou 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Dechow, Ge and 
Schrand 2010; Gunny 2010; McGuire et al. 2011; Zang et al. 2011), we control for firm 
characteristics, including the natural log of the book value of assets (SIZE), the natural 
log of the number of years since the year a firm first appeared in Compustat (Firm Age), 
inventory scaled by total assets (Inventory Ratio), total liabilities scaled by total assets 
(LEV), the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities plus total 
debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
(NOA), Big N auditor (Big N), sales growth (Sales Growth), the natural log of the 
number of years the auditor has been working with the firm (Auditor Tenure), and the 
standard deviation of operating cash flows scaled by total assets over the past five fiscal 
years (Operating Volatility).  Finally, we include industry and year dummies to control 
                                           
10 We have also tried classifying CEO age into three groups: 50-55, 56-59 and >=60. Our results are 
robust to this classification. 
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for industry and year fixed effects. Appendix A describes in detail all variables used in 
the model. 
4.2. Main Results 
4.2.1. CEO Sensation Seeking and Accrual-based Earnings Management 11 
Table 3 presents the estimation results relating CEO sensation seeking to 
accrual-based earnings management. We find that accrual-based earnings management 
is positively related to pilot CEOs, as indicated by the coefficient β1, which equals 0.008 
with a t-value of 2.38 for accrual-based earnings management AM1. The results for 
AM2 are similar. Firms with pilot CEOs engage in more accrual-based earnings 
management than firms without pilot CEOs. As for economic significance, the extent 
of accrual-based earnings management of firms with pilot CEOs is 0.008 larger than 
that of firms without pilot CEOs. The economic impact of pilot CEOs on accrual 
earnings management is 10.53% of our sample mean AM1 of 0.064 and 9.21% of our 
sample mean AM2 of 0.076, which is clearly nontrivial. These results show that the 
possession of a private pilot license is associated with more aggressive accrual-based 
earnings management.  
The results for the control variables are mostly consistent with prior research 
(Lobo and Zhou 2006; Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010; McGuire et al. 2011; Zang et al. 
2011). Firms with a higher inventory ratio, leverage, and sales growth engage in more 
accrual-based earnings management. Firms with longer-tenured CEOs, firms of larger 
size, firms with higher net operating assets, firms associated with Big N auditors, and 
                                           
11  We have also investigated the relationship between CEO sensation seeking and real earnings 
management. We find that sensation-seeking CEOs (proxied by the possession of a pilot license) are 
more likely to engage in real earnings management. We omit these results for several reasons. First, real 
earnings management is harder to catch and easier for managers to justify. Second, there is no risk to 
managers in real earnings management, as it is not an illegal activity so there is no litigation concern and 
it does not involve manipulating the numbers within GAAP so there is no auditing concern. Third, real 
activities such as real earnings management are operating decisions and not reporting decisions. 
 16 
 
older firms engage in less accrual-based earnings management. 
4.2.2 CEO Sensation Seeking and Information Opacity 
Table 4 presents the estimation results relating CEO sensation seeking to 
information opacity. The dependent variables are the moving sum of three years’ 
absolute value of discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model (AM1) and that 
from the ROA-adjusted modified Jones model (AM2) (Hutton et al. 2009). The 
coefficient on Pilot CEO is 0.033 in column (1) and 0.020 in column (2), with p-values 
less than 0.01 (t-values = 4.62 and 3.64). Both information opacity measures are higher 
for firms with pilot CEOs. These findings complement the evidence in Table 4. We 
continue to find that firms with pilot CEOs have lower accounting quality as measured 
by information opacity. The economic impact of pilot CEOs on information opacity is 
13.98% of the sample mean of 0.236 and 9.80% of the sample mean of 0.204. Overall, 
pilot CEOs have an economically significant impact on information opacity. 
For the control variables, we find that firms with higher inventory ratio and 
longer auditor tenure have higher information opacity. Firms with longer-tenured CEOs, 
firms of larger size, older firms, firms with higher net operating assets, and firms with 
larger sales growth all have lower information opacity. 
4.2.3 CEO Sensation Seeking and AAER Accounting Fraud 
Following Davidson et al. (2015), we use AAER accounting fraud to capture 
financial reporting quality. Table 5 presents the results relating CEO sensation seeking 
and AAER accounting fraud. We find that pilot CEOs are positively related to AAER 
accounting fraud, as indicated by the coefficient β1, which equals 0.028 with a t-value 
of 3.22. The results are also economically significant. Specifically, firms with pilot 
CEOs are 2.84% more likely to be involved in AAER accounting fraud.12 
                                           
12 The value is calculated as (e^0.028-1) = 0.0284. 
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Among the control variables, firms with CEOs between 50 and 59 years of age, 
overconfident CEOs, larger assets, higher net operating assets, and higher inventory 
ratios are more likely to engage in AAER accounting fraud. Firms audited by Big N 
auditors are less likely to engage in AAER accounting fraud.  
4.2.4 CEO Sensation Seeking and Financial Reporting Quality: Corporate Governance 
Effects 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find that firms with stronger corporate 
governance, measured by the governance index (G-index), have higher profits, higher 
sales growth, and are associated with a higher firm value. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) 
examine the relation between corporate governance and accounting restatement. They 
find that the independence and financial expertise of boards and audit committees are 
negatively correlated with earnings restatement, indicating that corporate governance 
play a role in constraining managers’ earnings manipulation.  
In this paper, we test whether corporate governance moderates the relationship 
between pilot CEOs and financial reporting quality. Following Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003), we use the G-index to capture the strength of corporate governance. A 
higher G-index indicates poorer external corporate governance. Corporate governance 
is equal to one if the G-index is below the sample median and zero otherwise. 
Table 6 reports the regression results after considering the impact of corporate 
governance on financial accounting quality. Columns (1) to (4) and (7) show that the 
interaction term is insignificant, indicating that stronger corporate governance does not 
mitigate the relation between pilot CEOs and financial reporting quality as measured 
by accrual-based earnings management (AM1 and AM2), information opacity (Opacity1 
and Opacity2) and AAER.  
Taken together, we find that better corporate governance does not mitigate the 
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adverse effect of pilot CEOs on financial reporting quality. 
5. Additional Analysis 
 
5.1 CEO Sensation Seeking and Internal Control Quality 
According to SEC (SEC 2004), internal control over financial reporting refers 
to the set of “controls that pertain to the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes that are fairly presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles.”13 A deficiency or material weakness in the internal control system could 
cause a decrease in financial reporting quality and an increase in the probability of 
restatement (PCAOB, 2007).14, 15 
We define an indicator variable, ICD, that is equal to one if a firm has a 
significant deficiency or material weakness in internal controls and zero otherwise. We 
examine how CEO personal sensation seeking influences internal control quality. Table 
7 reports the results. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the coefficient on pilot 
CEO is significantly positive (β1=0.036, t value=2.10) in column (1) of Table 7. Based 
on severity, prior literature (Doyle et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2011) has usually classified 
ICD into two categories: account-level and company-level ICD. This paper is mainly 
concerned with the effect of CEO sensation seeking on financial reporting quality and 
accounting fraud is one of the most severe financial reporting irregularities. We thus 
classify ICD into fraud and non-fraud level ICD. Fraud-level ICD indicates that the 
                                           
13 For SEC Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of 
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports (October 6, 2004), visit 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm#iia 
14 Audit Standard 2201 (A7) defines a significant deficiency as “a deficiency, or a combination of 
deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a 
material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected on a timely basis. .”  
15 Audit Standard No. 2201 (A11) defines a material weakness as “a deficiency, or a combination of 
deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting that is less severe than a material weakness, yet 
important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight of the company's financial 
reporting. .” 
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assessment of disclosure controls has identified financial fraud, irregularities, and 
misrepresentations.  
The results in column (2) show that Pilot CEO is positively correlated with 
Fraud_ICD (β1=0.005, T value=2.17), indicating that firms with pilot CEOs are more 
likely to have fraud-related internal control issues. Column (3) shows that the 
coefficient of pilot CEOs is positive and significant (β1=0.030, T value=1.79). These 
results indicate that firms with pilot CEOs have lower internal control quality, 
consistent with the results on pilot CEOs and accrual-based earnings management as 
well as information opacity. 
5.2 CEO Sensation Seeking and Accounting Conservatism 
Following Basu (1997) and Watts (2003), we define accounting conservatism 
as “the tendency to recognize losses more timely than gains.” Table 8 presents the 
relationship between pilot CEOs and accounting conservatism. Panel A presents the 
results for accounting conservatism based on the Basu (1997) return model. In this 
model, the variable of interest is the interaction between return and its sign. A greater 
interaction equates to higher accounting conservatism, which indicates that earnings 
reflect bad news timelier than they do about good news. Column (1) presents a 
relatively simple model, including the original Basu variables and variables related to 
pilot CEOs. This column shows that the coefficient on the interaction term DR*Return 
is significantly positive (the coefficient is 0.307 with a t-value of 9.77). The coefficient 
on Pilot CEO*DR*Return is significantly negative (the coefficient is -0.341 with a t-
value of -4.20). In column (2), we further control for confounding variables such as 
SIZE, LEV and CEO overconfidence. We continue to find a significantly negative 
coefficient on Pilot CEO*DR*Return (the coefficient is -0.253 with a t-value of -2.82). 
This shows that companies with pilot CEOs are associated with less accounting 
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conservatism. In column (2), we control for CEO overconfidence. The coefficient on 
Overconfidence*DR*Return is significantly negative (the coefficient is -0.021 with a t-
value of -2.94), which shows that firms with overconfident CEOs incorporate good 
news more aggressively than they do about bad news. This is consistent with Ahmed 
and Duellman (2013). The pilot CEO results still hold after controlling for CEO 
overconfidence, which shows that overconfidence and sensation seeking as proxied by 
the possession of a pilot license capture two distinct CEO characteristics.  
Panel B presents the regression results using an alternative measure of 
accounting conservatism: the net income change model (Basu 1997). The results 
continue to show that firms with pilot CEOs are less likely to exhibit accounting 
conservatism. 
5.3 CEO Sensation Seeking and Audit Pricing 
The results so far demonstrate that CEO sensation seeking is associated with 
lower financial reporting quality. In this part, we examine whether auditors consider 
CEO personal risk-taking when setting their audit fees. A motivation for this part of the 
study is that Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Release No. 
2014-002 calls for auditors to pay attention to the behaviors of executive officers. Chen 
et al. (2015) find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return 
volatility (Vega) are charged higher audit fees. Cain and McKeon (2016) show that 
firms with pilot CEOs are more likely to employ higher Vega compensation structure. 
Thus, we predict that auditors would charge firms led by pilot CEOs higher audit fees. 
Our results are consistent with the prediction that CEO sensation seeking is 
reflected in audit fees. After controlling for other confounding factors, Table 9 shows 
that the coefficient of pilot CEOs is positive and significant (the coefficient is 0.104 
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with a t-value of 2.87). This result is also economically significant. Audit fees for firms 
with pilot CEOs are 10.96% (𝑒0.104 − 1) higher than those for firms without pilot CEOs.  
6. Robustness Checks 
6.1. The Difference in Difference Method: CEO Turnover 
To potentially identify a causal effect, in this test, we use CEO turnover as a 
quasi-experiment. First, we identify all the CEO turnover events in our sample period. 
Second, we create one indicator variable equals 1 if a non-pilot CEO is replaced by a 
pilot CEO in the year t (treatment group), 0 if CEO does not change in the year t (control 
group)16. In our sample, we have 40 observations with non-pilot CEO replaced by pilot 
CEO. Third, we choose 9 firm-level variables to calculate the propensity score, 
including SIZE, Firm Age, Inventory Ratio, LEV, NOA, Big N, Auditor tenure, Sale 
Growth, and Operating Volatility. Fourth, we match each observation in the treatment 
group with one in control group with the closet propensity score within 3 percent caliper. 
Fifth, for each observation in the matched sample, we also identify the pre- and post-
period based on event year and we create the other indicator variable: Post is 1 for the 
post CEO turnover period (3 years), 0 for pre-period (3 years). Then we put Treatment, 
Post and the interaction term Treatment*Post into the regression. As shown in Table 
10, the coefficient of Treatment*Post is positive and significant in four columns out of 
five. The results show that after pilot CEO takes over a company, the financial reporting 
quality deteriorates. 
6.2. Instrument Variable Method: CEO Sensation Seeking and Financial Reporting 
Quality 
                                           
16 In another additional test, we also consider another treatment group, which a pilot CEO is replaced 
by a non-pilot CEO in the year t. The control group is still the observations that CEO does not change 
in the year t. We find the coefficient of Treatment*Post is negative but insignificant. 
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Hiring a CEO with pilot credentials might not be a random event. In our 
robustness check, we employ an instrumental variable and the Heckman two-stage 
model to address this potential endogeneity issue. In the first stage, we predict the 
likelihood that a firm hires a pilot CEO. More specifically, we include firm size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA) and firm age (Firm Age) of year t-1 in the 
regression. Based on the statistics on active aviation pilots per capita, we also include 
the Pilot States, which is equal to one if a firm is headquartered in the top 25 states of 
active aviation pilots per capita and zero otherwise.17 We choose this variable as the 
instrumental variable for two reasons. First, if a firm is located in a state where more 
pilots reside, the firm would naturally have higher chance of recruiting a CEO with 
pilot credentials. Second, active aviation pilots per capita at the state-level should be 
exogenous to the individual firm.  
 Panel A of Table 11 reports the results of the first-stage regression. We find that 
the coefficient of Pilot States is significantly positive, which is consistent with our 
prediction. This means that if the headquarter state has more pilots per capita, chances 
are greater that a firm would end up with a pilot as its CEO. We calculate the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR) from the first stage and include this ratio in the second stage. Panel 
B reports the second-stage results. After including IMR, our main results are still robust. 
6.2 Propensity Score Matching Method: CEO Sensation Seeking and Financial 
Reporting Quality 
A competing explanation for our main results is that the effects of CEO 
sensation seeking are produced from firms’ characteristics, instead of from the pilot 
CEOs themselves. We employ propensity score matching (PSM) to rule out this 
                                           
17 These 25 states are Alaska, Montana, Colorado, North Dakota, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Idaho, 
Washington, Arizona, Utah, South Dakota, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, Florida, Oregon, New Mexico, 
Hawaii, Maine, Oklahoma, Vermont, Nebraska, Georgia, Texas and Iowa. 
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potential explanation. In the first stage, we use the predictors of financial reporting 
quality as matched variables: Age 50-59, Age>=60, Ln(Tenure), Overconfidence, Delta, 
Vega, SIZE, Firm Age, Inventory Ratio, LEV, NOA, Big N, Sales Growth, Auditor 
Tenure and Operating Volatility. We compute the propensity score based on the 
coefficients estimated from the first-stage regression. Then we match each treatment 
(firm-year with pilot CEO) with the control (firm-year without pilot CEO) having the 
closest propensity score (caliper=0.03). We repeat our main analysis using the PSM 
matched sample and find that our results remain robust (See Table 12). 
7. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we investigate the effects of sensation seeking — a previously 
understudied aspect of managerial psychology — on financial reporting quality. We 
find evidence that firms led by CEOs with pilot credentials have lower financial 
reporting quality. More specifically, such firms engage in more accrual-based earnings 
management, have higher information opacity, are more likely to have AAER 
restatements, and are more likely to have internal control deficiencies. Our results 
suggest that the personal trait of sensation seeking has implications for financial 
reporting quality. 
 Our results have important implications for the financial reporting quality 
literature. Many studies have demonstrated a relationship between compensation 
structure, debt covenants and financial reporting quality. These studies have relied on 
complex contracting to establish the effect on financial reporting quality. However, 
sensation seeking such as piloting airplanes can serve as an ex ante indicator of and 
simple proxy for financial reporting quality. 
 Future research can build on studies on sensation seeking and expand to other 
managerial characteristics. There is a consensus in the field of personality psychology 
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on a general taxonomy of personality traits known as the five-factor model: openness 
to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Tupes 
and Christal 1961). Future research can explore how the relatively unexplored 
personality traits such as extraversion affect financial reporting quality. 
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Appendix A 
Variable name Variable definitions and constructions 
Accrual-based EM  
AM1 
Abnormal Accruals estimated using a cross-sectional modified-Jones model 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Dechow et al. 1995). 
Abnormal accruals  are estimated as the residual from modified-Jones model 
from the following industry-year regression: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝜆1(1/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1) + 𝜆2(Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − Δ𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜆3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 
Following Dechow et al., (1995), the estimates of 𝜆1, 𝜆2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆3  are those 
obtained from original Jones model. Where total accrual is earnings 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the 
operating cash flows. Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 is the change of  total revenue from t-1 to t 
year, Δ𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 is the change of net receivables from t-1 to t year, and PPE 
is the gross property, plant and equipment. Source: Compustat 
AM2 
ROA matched modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Where ROA is return on total assets.  Source: Compustat 
Information Opacity  
Information Opacity1 
The prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (AM1) (Hutton et al., 2009). Source: Compustat 
Information Opacity2 
The prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (AM2) (Hutton et al., 2009). Source: Compustat 
Accounting Fraud  
AAER 
Indicator variable that equals one for a firm-year has AAER restatement, and 
zero otherwise. 
Internal Control Weakness  
ICD 
Indicator variable that equals one for a firm-year that indicates a significant 
deficiency or material weakness and zero otherwise. Source:  Audit 
Analytics   
Fraud_ICD 
Indicator variable that equals one if ICD related with financial fraud, 
irregularities, and misrepresentations. See Taxonomy of Issues for more 
detail. Source:  Audit Analytics   
Non_Fraud_ICD 
Indicator variable that equals one if ICD is not related to financial fraud, 
irregularities, and misrepresentations. See Taxonomy of Issues for more 
detail. Source:  Audit Analytics   
Accounting Conservatism  
𝑋𝑖𝑡 Earnings in year t scaled by lagged market value. Source: Compustat 
Return Annual accumulated return in fiscal year. Source: Compustat 
DReturn 
Indicator variable that equals one if the return is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Compustat. 
Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡  The change of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 from year t-1 to year t. Source: Compustat. 
Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 The change of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 from year t-2 to year t-1. Source: Compustat. 
DΔ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 
Indicator variable that equals one if Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Compustat. 
CEO Sensation Seeking 
Pilot CEO 1 if CEO has had at least one certificate in FAA records, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration 
Age 50-59 
1 if CEO’s age is between 50 and 59, 0 otherwise.  Source: Compustat 
ExecuComp 
Age >=60 
1 if CEO’s age is larger than 60, 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
ExecuComp 
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Female CEO 1 if CEO is a female, 0 otherwise; Source: Compustat ExecuComp 
Ln (Tenure) 
Natural log of Years of service as CEO at given firm; Source: Compustat 
ExecuComp 
Over confidence 
Principle components of three overconfidence measurements: Holder100, 
CAPEX, and Over-Invest. Holder100 is equal to one when the ratio of the 
value of options in-the-money to the average strike price exceeds 100% at 
least twice during the sample period, zero otherwise. CAPEX is equal to one 
if the capital expenditures deflated by lagged total assets is greater than the 
median level of capital expenditures to lagged total assets for the firm’s 
Fama–French 48 industry, zero otherwise. Over-Invest is equal to one if the 
residual of a regression of total asset growth on sales growth run by 
industry-year is greater than zero, zero otherwise. Source: Compustat 
ExecuComp  and Thomson Reuters 
Delta 
Delta refers to the change in dollar value of CEO’s wealth for one 
percentage point change in stock price. Source:  
https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/ 
Vega 
Vega refers to the change in dollar value of CEO’s wealth for 0.01 change in 
annualized standard deviation of stock return. Source: 
https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/ 
Firm-Level Control Variables  
Size The natural log of the total asset. Sources: Compustat 
Firm Age 
Natural logarithm of years since the first year covered on Compustat 
Sources: Compustat 
Inventory Ratio Inventory divided by total assets. Sources: Compustat 
LEV 
The book value of all liabilities scaled by total assets, measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Sources: Compustat 
NOA 
Net operating assets, which is defined as the sum of shareholders’ equity less 
cash and marketable securities plus total debt at the beginning of the year, 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. Sources: Compustat 
Big N 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if a Big 5 or 4 audit firm was the external 
auditor for a firm year observation, and 0 otherwise. Sources: Compustat 
Sales Growth Growth rate in sales Sources: Compustat 
Operating Volatility 
Standard deviation of operating cash flows from scaled by total assets over 
the past five fiscal years. Source: Compustat. 
Auditor Tenure 
Natural log of the number of years the auditor has been with the firm. 
Sources: Compustat 
ROA The income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
Loss  
Indicator variable that equals 1 if income before extraordinary items was 
negative in the current or previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise.  
Sources: Compustat 
M&A 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is involved in mergers or 
acquisitions and 0 otherwise. Sources: Compustat 
Restructure 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if any of RCA, RCD, RCEPS, and RCP 
are non-zero, and 0 otherwise. Sources: Compustat 
Foreign 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has a nonzero foreign currency 
translation and 0 otherwise. Sources: Compustat 
Number of Segments The number of business segments of the firm. Sources: Compustat 
Going Concern 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is issued by a going-concern 
opinion and 0 otherwise. Sources:  Audit Analytics   
 
Litigation Risk 
Indicator variable equal to one for high litigation risk industries (SIC 2833-
2836; 3570-3577; 7370-7374; 3600-3674; 5200-5961; 8731-8734) and zero 
otherwise, as defined in Francis et al. (1994) 
Corporate Governance  
Corporate Governance Corporate Governance equals 1 if G-index is lower than sample median, 0 
otherwise.  G-index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) with larger values 
of G-index indicating weaker corporate governance.  
Audit Fees  
Audit Fees The natural log of the total audit fees. Sources:  Audit Analytics   
Difference in Difference Test  
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Treatment 
An indicator variable equals 1 if a non-pilot CEO is replaced by a pilot CEO 
in the year t (treatment group), 0 if CEO does not change in the year t 
(control group). 
Post 
An indicator variable equals 1 for the post CEO turnover period (3 years), 0 
for pre-period (3 years). 
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Table 1 Sample Selection and Distribution  
Panel A: Sample selection 
The sample consists of 11,194 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2010. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix 
 Number of firm years 
Total firm-year observations with CEO data available on the 
ExecuComp database from 1992–2010 
31,885 
Less:   
financial services and utility industries  (4,361) 
insufficient data to calculate CEO characteristics measures (9,714) 
insufficient data to calculate financial reporting quality and control 
variables 
(5,616) 
Final sample 11,194 
 
Panel B: Distribution by year 
Year Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
1992 34 0.300 0.300 
1993 162 1.450 1.750 
1994 275 2.460 4.210 
1995 386 3.450 7.660 
1996 476 4.250 11.91 
1997 530 4.730 16.64 
1998 594 5.310 21.95 
1999 674 6.020 27.97 
2000 750 6.700 34.67 
2001 765 6.830 41.50 
2002 789 7.050 48.55 
2003 831 7.420 55.98 
2004 817 7.300 63.27 
2005 776 6.930 70.21 
2006 760 6.790 77.00 
2007 711 6.350 83.35 
2008 695 6.210 89.56 
2009 616 5.500 95.06 
2010 553 4.940 100 
Total 11,194 100  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
Financial Reporting Quality Measures 
AM1 11,194 0.064 0.061 0.021 0.046 0.087 
AM2 11,194 0.076 0.072 0.025 0.055 0.103 
Information Opacity1 11,194 0.236 0.173 0.114 0.188 0.304 
Information Opacity2 11,194 0.204 0.147 0.103 0.164 0.256 
AAER 11,194 0.017 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ICD 6,548 0.089 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fraud_ICD 6,548 0.002 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non_Fraud_ICD 6,548 0.087 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Characteristics       
Pilot CEO 11,194 0.051 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 50-59 11,194 0.249 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age >=60 11,194 0.725 0.447 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Female CEO 11,194 0.026 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ln (Tenure) 11,194 1.412 0.719 1.099 1.386 1.946 
Over confidence 11,194 0.814 0.537 0.441 0.637 1.078 
Delta 11,194 135.50 334.20 4.55 30.83 105.90 
Vega 11,194 42.60 86.45 2.08 12.20 40.53 
Firm Characteristics        
SIZE 11,194 7.213 1.519 6.115 7.089 8.178 
Firm Age 11,194 2.997 0.739 2.398 3.045 3.689 
Inventory Ratio 11,194 0.121 0.118 0.022 0.098 0.175 
LEV 11,194 0.519 0.216 0.367 0.523 0.656 
NOA 11,194 0.534 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Big N 11,194 0.692 0.462 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Auditor tenure  11,194 2.260 0.889 1.792 2.398 2.996 
Sales growth 11,194 0.108 0.266 -0.013 0.076 0.180 
Operating Volatility 11,194 0.053 0.052 0.024 0.040 0.065 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation 
  
A B C D E F G H I 
Pilot CEO A 1.00             
AM1 B 0.02 1.00 
   
    
AM2 C 0.01 0.64 1.00 
  
    
Information 
Opacity1 
D 0.03 0.24 0.30 1.00 
 
    
Information 
Opacity2 
E 0.02 0.29 0.23 0.77 1.00     
AAER F 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 1.00    
ICD G 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00   
Fraud_ICD H 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 1.00  
Non_Fraud_ICD I 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.17 1.00 
Panel B reports Pearson correlations between the pilot CEOs and financial reporting quality. Bolded 
coefficients are significant at p<0.1 (two-tailed test) 
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Table 3 CEO Sensation-seeking and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on the accrual 
earnings management. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year and 
industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 (1) (2) 
 AM1 AM2 
Pilot CEO  
 
0.008** 0.007*** 
 (2.38) (2.72) 
Age 50-59 -0.006 -0.003 
 (-1.39) (-0.71) 
Age >=60 -0.003 0.000 
 (-0.62) (0.02) 
Female CEO 0.001 0.007* 
 (0.14) (1.81) 
Ln (Tenure) -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.83) 
Over confidence 0.000 0.002* 
 (0.23) (1.94) 
Delta 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.81) (-0.77) 
Vega -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.41) (1.13) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.54) (-5.70) 
Firm Age -0.002* -0.004*** 
 (-1.83) (-4.52) 
Inventory Ratio 0.036*** -0.004 
 (3.98) (-0.45) 
LEV 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 (3.75) (3.84) 
NOA -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.10) (-4.04) 
Big N -0.004 -0.006* 
 (-1.13) (-1.91) 
Auditor tenure  -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.10) (-0.25) 
Sales growth 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 (4.94) (5.09) 
Operating Volatility 0.198*** 0.278*** 
 (8.58) (15.86) 
Intercept 0.049*** 0.051*** 
 (3.44) (3.86) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 11,194 11,194 
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.135 
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Table 4 CEO Sensation-seeking and Information Opacity 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on the information 
opacity. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year and industry 
dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 (1) (2) 
 Information Opacity1 Information Opacity2 
Pilot CEO  
 
0.033*** 0.020*** 
 (4.62) (3.64) 
Age 50-59 -0.005 -0.009 
 (-0.50) (-1.05) 
Age >=60 -0.002 -0.012 
 (-0.23) (-1.36) 
Female CEO 0.005 0.019** 
 (0.57) (2.40) 
Ln (Tenure) -0.003 -0.003* 
 (-1.30) (-1.79) 
Over confidence -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.20) (-0.84) 
Delta 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.82) (1.90) 
Vega -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.42) (1.28) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (-2.66) (-2.73) 
Firm Age -0.020*** -0.030*** 
 (-7.76) (-13.54) 
Inventory Ratio 0.124*** -0.017 
 (6.16) (-0.95) 
LEV -0.001 -0.006 
 (-0.06) (-0.79) 
NOA -0.013*** -0.018*** 
 (-4.22) (-7.27) 
Big N -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.93) (-1.00) 
Auditor tenure  -0.008*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.34) (-3.84) 
Sales growth 0.024*** 0.028*** 
 (2.98) (4.23) 
Operating Volatility 0.930*** 0.981*** 
 (15.22) (16.99) 
Intercept 0.097*** 0.177*** 
 (3.86) (7.92) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 11,194 11,194 
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.303 
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Table 5 CEO Sensation-seeking and Accounting Fraud 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on the AAER 
accounting fraud. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year and 
industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
 (1) 
 AAER 
Pilot CEO  
 
0.028*** 
 (3.22) 
Age 50-59 0.014** 
 (2.50) 
Age >=60 -0.004 
 (-0.70) 
Female CEO 0.011 
 (1.18) 
Ln (Tenure) -0.001 
 (-0.40) 
Over confidence 0.005** 
 (2.03) 
Delta 0.000 
 (0.63) 
Vega -0.000 
 (-0.04) 
SIZE 0.007*** 
 (5.70) 
Firm Age -0.002 
 (-0.87) 
Inventory Ratio 0.066*** 
 (3.71) 
LEV 0.011* 
 (1.75) 
NOA 0.012*** 
 (4.55) 
Big N -0.027*** 
 (-3.38) 
Auditor tenure  -0.001 
 (-0.65) 
Sales growth 0.010 
 (1.58) 
Operating Volatility -0.023 
 (-0.82) 
Intercept -0.078*** 
 (-5.89) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL 
No. of observations 11,194 
Pseudo R2 0.036 
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Table 6 CEO Sensation-seeking and Financial Reporting Quality: Corporate 
Governance Effects 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of corporate governance on the relation between 
CEO sensation-seeking and financial reporting quality. To conserve space, we do not report the 
coefficient estimates for the year and industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 AM1 AM2 Information 
Opacity1 
Information 
Opacity2 
AAER 
Pilot CEO  
 
0.008** 0.008** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.022** 
 (2.22) (2.51) (4.41) (3.74) (2.46) 
Corporate Governance -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002*** 
 (-0.63) (-1.52) (1.19) (0.45) (-3.71) 
Pilot CEO* Corporate Governance -0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.021 
 (-0.41) (-0.39) (-0.58) (-1.05) (0.97) 
Age 50-59 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 0.015** 
 (-1.38) (-0.68) (-0.51) (-1.05) (2.54) 
Age >=60 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 
 (-0.61) (0.04) (-0.24) (-1.37) (-0.61) 
Female CEO 0.001 0.007* 0.005 0.019** 0.011 
 (0.13) (1.79) (0.58) (2.40) (1.15) 
Ln (Tenure) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.003* -0.001 
 (-2.80) (-2.87) (-1.29) (-1.80) (-0.44) 
Over confidence 0.000 0.002* -0.000 -0.00200 0.004* 
 (0.22) (1.92) (-0.17) (-0.82) (1.96) 
Delta 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.80) (-0.80) (1.84) (1.91) (0.57) 
Vega -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.41) (1.12) (-1.42) (1.29) (-0.06) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.007*** 
 (-4.53) (-5.68) (-2.68) (-2.74) (5.75) 
Firm Age -0.002* -0.004*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.00100 
 (-1.72) (-4.23) (-7.83) (-13.41) (-0.27) 
Inventory Ratio 0.036*** -0.004 0.124*** -0.0170 0.065*** 
 (3.94) (-0.50) (6.16) (-0.97) (3.70) 
LEV 0.016*** 0.014*** -0.00100 -0.00600 0.013** 
 (3.77) (3.91) (-0.12) (-0.82) (1.96) 
NOA -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.018*** 0.011*** 
 (-4.10) (-4.05) (-4.19) (-7.25) (4.49) 
Big N -0.004 -0.006* -0.008 -0.007 -0.027*** 
 (-1.12) (-1.89) (-0.95) (-1.02) (-3.33) 
Auditor tenure  -0.001 0.000 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.001 
 (-1.10) (-0.27) (-4.30) (-3.80) (-0.75) 
Sales growth 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.010 
 (4.94) (5.09) (2.97) (4.22) (1.60) 
Operating Volatility 0.198*** 0.278*** 0.930*** 0.981*** -0.0250 
 (8.56) (15.79) (15.26) (17.02) (-0.88) 
Intercept 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.092*** 0.176*** -0.065*** 
 (3.50) (4.02) (3.62) (7.79) (-4.74) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 11,194 11,194 11,194 11,194 11,194 
Adjusted R2 /Pseudo R2 0.143 0.135 0.296 0.303 0.0373 
 
 
 39 
 
Table 7 CEO Sensation-seeking and Internal Control Quality 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on the internal control 
weakness. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year and industry 
dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ICD Fraud_ICD Non_Fraud_ICD 
Pilot CEO  
 
0.036** 0.005** 0.030* 
 (2.10) (2.17) (1.79) 
Age 50-59 -0.011 0.001 -0.012 
 (-0.62) (0.36) (-0.68) 
Age >=60 -0.014 0.003 -0.016 
 (-0.75) (0.96) (-0.90) 
Female CEO 0.037* -0.001 0.038* 
 (1.81) (-0.32) (1.87) 
Ln (Tenure) -0.015*** -0.002** -0.013*** 
 (-2.88) (-1.98) (-2.60) 
Over confidence -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.43) 
Delta -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.34) (-0.57) (-1.26) 
Vega 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.55) (-0.02) (1.56) 
SIZE -0.011*** -0.000 -0.011*** 
 (-3.61) (-0.71) (-3.53) 
ROA -0.112*** -0.004 -0.108*** 
 (-4.27) (-1.04) (-4.15) 
Firm Age 0.016*** 0.001 0.015** 
 (2.59) (0.67) (2.51) 
Inventory Ratio -0.038 -0.008 -0.030 
 (-0.86) (-1.23) (-0.68) 
M&A 0.011 0.000 0.011 
 (1.54) (0.25) (1.51) 
Sales Growth 0.013 -0.000 0.013 
 (0.80) (-0.02) (0.81) 
Restructure 0.027*** -0.001 0.027*** 
 (3.44) (-0.45) (3.54) 
Foreign  0.033*** 0.003** 0.030*** 
 (4.14) (2.26) (3.84) 
Number of Segments -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.71) (-0.22) (-0.68) 
Intercept -0.008 -0.001 -0.007 
 (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.11) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 6548 6548 6548 
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.010 0.0500 
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Table 8 CEO Sensation-seeking and Accounting Conservatism 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on audit fees. To 
conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year and industry dummies. The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Earnings-Price model 
 (1) (2) 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
DReturn 0.022*** 0.027 
 (4.44) (0.96) 
Return -0.012 -0.090** 
 (-1.02) (-2.49) 
DReturn*Return 0.307*** 0.502*** 
 (9.77) (5.90) 
Pilot CEO -0.019* -0.009 
 (-1.83) (-0.88) 
Pilot CEO *DReturn -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 (-2.62) (-3.28) 
Pilot CEO *Return 0.072 0.036 
 (1.59) (0.82) 
Pilot CEO *DReturn*Return -0.341*** -0.253*** 
 (-4.20) (-2.83) 
Size  0.009*** 
  (5.07) 
Size *DReturn  -0.061*** 
  (-4.86) 
Size *Return  0.013** 
  (2.30) 
Size *DReturn*Return  -0.003 
  (-0.96) 
Lev  -0.081*** 
  (-6.17) 
Lev*DReturn  0.468*** 
  (5.71) 
Lev*Return  0.002 
  (0.04) 
Lev*DReturn*Return  0.053** 
  (2.30) 
Over confidence  0.027*** 
  (4.09) 
Over confidence *DReturn  -0.153*** 
  (-6.74) 
Over confidence *Return  0.004 
  (0.34) 
Over confidence *DReturn*Return  -0.022*** 
  (-3.78) 
Intercept 0.017 -0.036 
 (0.62) (-1.46) 
IND & YEAR CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 10,867 10,867 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.247 
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Panel B: Earnings Change model 
 (1) (2) 
 Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 
𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 -0.018*** -0.010 
 (-7.80) (-0.72) 
Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 0.008 0.209 
 (0.27) (1.25) 
𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1*Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 -0.693*** -0.019 
 (-16.32) (-0.08) 
Pilot CEO -0.010 -0.006 
 (-1.42) (-0.88) 
Pilot CEO *𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 0.048*** 0.043*** 
 (4.60) (3.96) 
Pilot CEO * Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 0.630 0.447 
 (1.36) (0.99) 
Pilot CEO *𝑫𝚫𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏*𝚫𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 3.212*** 3.307*** 
 (2.73) (2.91) 
Size  0.003** 
  (1.97) 
Size*𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  -0.001 
  (-0.62) 
Size* Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  -0.034 
  (-1.30) 
Size*𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1*Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  -0.079** 
  (-2.10) 
Lev  -0.048*** 
  (-4.60) 
Lev*𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  0.017 
  (1.18) 
Lev* Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  0.001 
  (0.01) 
Lev*𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1*Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  -0.208 
  (-0.96) 
Over confidence  0.017*** 
  (7.08) 
Over confidence *𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  -0.006 
  (-1.57) 
Over confidence * Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  0.042 
  (1.25) 
Over confidence *𝐷Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1*Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  -0.031 
  (-0.65) 
Intercept -0.032* -0.043* 
 (-1.71) (-1.95) 
IND & YEAR CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 11,092 11,092 
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.204 
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Table 9 CEO Sensation-seeking and Audit Pricing 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on audit fees. To 
conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year and industry dummies. The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 (1) 
 Audit Fees 
Pilot CEO  
 
0.104*** 
 (2.87) 
Age 50-59 -0.206*** 
 (-5.83) 
Age >=60 -0.120*** 
 (-3.38) 
Female CEO 0.046 
 (1.18) 
Ln (Tenure) -0.049*** 
 (-4.38) 
Over confidence -0.035** 
 (-2.40) 
SIZE 0.612*** 
 (97.98) 
ROA -0.235*** 
 (-4.01) 
Loss 0.121*** 
 (6.75) 
Firm Age 0.077*** 
 (6.40) 
Inventory Ratio 0.160* 
 (1.72) 
M&A 0.070*** 
 (4.54) 
Sales growth -0.116*** 
 (-3.34) 
Restructure 0.147*** 
 (8.99) 
Foreign  0.246*** 
 (15.49) 
Number of Segments 0.008*** 
 (4.38) 
Going Concern 0.108 
 (1.05) 
Litigation Risk -0.077** 
 (-2.44) 
Intercept 2.932*** 
 (26.30) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL 
No. of observations 7,688 
Adjusted R2 0.720 
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Table 10 CEO Sensation-seeking and Financial Reporting Quality: Difference in 
Difference 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of corporate governance on the relation between 
CEO sensation-seeking and financial reporting quality. To conserve space, we do not report the 
coefficient estimates for the year and industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 AM1 AM2 Information 
Opacity1 
Information 
Opacity2 
AAER 
Treatment 
 
-0.037* -0.0140 -0.157*** -0.076** -0.155*** 
 (-1.88) (-0.94) (-3.55) (-2.45) (-3.65) 
Post -0.017* 0.00200 0.00900 0.0170 0.055* 
 (-1.77) (0.26) (0.49) (0.99) (1.69) 
Treatment*Post 0.062*** 0.012 0.199*** 0.071* 0.096* 
 (2.85) (0.76) (4.02) (1.93) (1.74) 
Age 50-59 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.57) (0.16) (2.13) (0.97) (-0.77) 
Female CEO -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.36) (-0.89) (-1.30) (0.20) (-0.17) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.0200 0.022** 0.086*** 0.051** 0.007 
 (1.52) (2.26) (3.01) (2.28) (0.20) 
Over confidence -0.004 -0.059* -0.038 -0.113** -0.081 
 (-0.19) (-1.96) (-0.73) (-2.54) (-1.24) 
Delta 0.004 0.000 0.030* 0.007 -0.025 
 (0.56) (0.04) (1.93) (0.55) (-0.89) 
Vega 0.014* 0.001 -0.002 -0.026* 0.049* 
 (1.83) (0.13) (-0.14) (-1.85) (1.73) 
SIZE -0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.054*** 
 (-0.40) (0.02) (-0.65) (0.15) (3.41) 
Firm Age -0.021* -0.025*** -0.061** -0.090*** -0.023 
 (-1.82) (-2.62) (-2.52) (-4.82) (-0.58) 
Inventory Ratio 0.036 -0.035 -0.050 -0.006 0.135 
 (0.39) (-0.50) (-0.31) (-0.05) (0.52) 
LEV 0.072* 0.082** 0.050 0.111* 0.0230 
 (1.77) (2.47) (0.70) (1.76) (0.28) 
NOA -0.002 -0.013* -0.036* -0.040*** 0.047* 
 (-0.20) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-2.86) (1.68) 
Big N 0.014 0.004 -0.089 -0.062 -0.053 
 (0.56) (0.18) (-1.57) (-1.23) (-1.04) 
Auditor tenure  -0.008* -0.005 -0.015 -0.005 -0.026* 
 (-1.75) (-1.34) (-1.54) (-0.61) (-1.67) 
Sales growth -0.017 0.001 0.068* 0.053 0.079 
 (-0.75) (0.06) (1.79) (1.60) (1.41) 
Operating Volatility -0.066 0.068 0.220 0.608** 0.341 
 (-0.35) (0.46) (0.59) (2.11) (0.77) 
Intercept 0.0690 0.100** 0.218** 0.229*** -0.359** 
 (1.49) (2.50) (2.17) (2.77) (-2.35) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 
No. of observations 353 353 353 353 353 
Adjusted R2 /Pseudo R2 0.0843 0.162 0.412 0.408 0.182 
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Table 11: Instrument Variable Method: CEO Sensation-seeking and Financial 
Reporting Quality 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on financial reporting 
quality by using instrument variable method. Panel A reports the Probit Regression of hiring pilot 
CEO. Panel B reports OLS/Logit regression of Pilot CEOs and financial reporting quality by including 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year 
and industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
Panel A: First Stage: Regression of hiring pilot CEOs 
 Model 1 
 Pilot CEO 
SIZEt-1 0.014 
 (0.77) 
LEVt-1 0.047 
 (0.36) 
ROAt-1 -0.583*** 
 (-4.35) 
Firm Aget-1 0.052 
 (1.53) 
Pilot Statest-1 0.286*** 
 (6.42) 
Intercept -6.431*** 
 (-31.31) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL 
No. of observations 9,612 
Pseudo R2 0.105 
 
 
Panel B: CEO sensation-seeking and Financial Reporting: IV method 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 AM1 AM2 
Information 
Opacity1 
Information 
Opacity2 
AAER 
Pilot CEO 0.007* 0.007*** 0.031*** 0.019** 0.031*** 
 (1.92) (2.95) (2.63) (2.27) (3.28) 
IMR YES YES YES YES YES 
Control YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 9,612 
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2 0.123 0.0820 0.221 0.182 0.0341 
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Table 12: Propensity Score Matching Method: CEO Sensation-seeking and Financial 
Reporting Quality 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of CEO sensation-seeking on financial reporting 
quality by using propensity score matching method. Panel A reports the Probit Regression of hiring 
pilot CEO. Panel B reports OLS/Logit regression of Pilot CEOs and financial reporting quality by 
including Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for 
the year and industry dummies. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that 
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
Panel A: First Stage: Calculating Propensity Score  
 Model 1 
 Pilot CEO 
Age 50-59 1.120* 
 (1.84) 
Age >=60 1.520** 
 (2.54) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.307*** 
 (4.23) 
Over confidence 0.036 
 (0.42) 
Delta -0.000 
 (-1.32) 
Vega 0.001 
 (0.90) 
SIZE -0.041 
 (-0.91) 
Firm Age 0.087 
 (1.18) 
Inventory Ratio -0.871 
 (-1.31) 
LEV 0.386 
 (1.41) 
NOA 0.0410 
 (0.44) 
Big N 0.659*** 
 (3.07) 
Auditor tenure  -0.111** 
 (-2.17) 
Sales growth 0.012 
 (0.06) 
Operating Volatility -0.454 
 (-0.41) 
Intercept -17.125*** 
 (-16.45) 
IND/YEAR CONTROL 
No. of observations 11,194 
Pseudo R2 0.097 
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Panel B: CEO sensation-seeking and Financial Reporting: PSM method 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 AM1 AM2 
Information 
Opacity1 
Information 
Opacity2 
AAER 
Pilot CEO 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.031** 0.021* 0.023** 
 (2.90) (3.41) (2.20) (1.94) (2.18) 
IMR YES YES YES YES YES 
Control YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144 
Adjusted R2 /Pseudo R2 0.133 0.150 0.321 0.326 0.0473 
 
 
 
 
 
